About this password strength checker
Inspect a proposed password using a small set of clearly stated rules. The result reports its character length, the number of character classes present, and flags for common passwords or repeated patterns. A score from zero to four earns points at lengths of eight, twelve and sixteen, with another point for at least three character classes. Very short, listed common or repetitive passwords receive a zero score.
Lowercase letters, uppercase letters, digits and other characters are the four classes. The common-password list includes examples such as password, qwerty, letmein and 123456. Repetition checks catch runs of four identical characters and repeated blocks. These checks are intentionally limited: they cannot recognize every dictionary word, personal detail, keyboard pattern or leaked password. A strong-by-these-rules label means only that the displayed checks passed.
Prefer a long, independently generated password for each account and store it in a password manager. This page does not estimate an attacker's hardware or query breach databases. It displays the entered text, so check it privately on a trusted device rather than presenting a real credential on a shared screen.
Which controls should I check first?
The Password Strength Checker form labels its controls as Input; Result. Use those labels to keep the source and settings separate. A sample argument that selects a mode is not additional source text. Choose the setting matching your intended operation before copying a result, and change it explicitly when comparing another mode. The labels describe what this form accepts; the worked examples below demonstrate only the stated supplied values.
How should I interpret this specific operation?
Read the individual flags beside the score. A zero caused by a common-password match differs from a zero caused by a short or repetitive string, even though the final score is the same. Length thresholds and class counts are explicit rules, not an estimated attacker budget. Do not interpret the highest rule score as proof that a secret is absent from all breach lists.
Worked helper values
These values come from the reproducible calculation examples supplied with this tool. Each row identifies the complete supplied arguments and the returned value. A visible ↵ denotes a line break and ⇥ denotes a tab in text examples. Settings appear alongside source data so that a different mode is not mistaken for an identical input. These are helper calculations, not observations of a live device, fetched target, image decoder, browser preview or downloaded file. Use the stated method above to relate the returned fields to the actual operation.
| Supplied values | Calculated return value |
|---|---|
| password | {"score": 0, "label": "Very weak", "length": 8, "classes": 1, "common": true, "repeated": false} |
| aB7!xZ2@qR8#vN4$ | {"score": 4, "label": "Very strong by these rules", "length": 16, "classes": 4, "common": false, "repeated": false} |
Which security property is this operation checking?
A rule score, a salted password hash and a decoded token answer different questions. Read the method above before interpreting the output. A score reports specified checks, a hash supports comparison under a particular format, and decoding reveals supplied data. None of those operations alone grants permission to a user or proves that a service accepts a credential. Identify the exact property needed by the destination workflow and keep any unperformed checks explicit. A readable result should not become an authentication claim merely because it contains a user label or looks cryptographic.
What makes the worked input reproducible?
The example fixes every value that affects its returned result. A bcrypt example can include a fixed salt for that reason, while a score example uses an explicit sample string. Such samples are public demonstrations and should never be saved as account secrets. Live randomized output is expected to differ when a new salt is generated. A decoded token likewise contains the supplied sample payload rather than verified external claims. Compare the demonstrated calculation with its stated expected fields, and keep generation, validation and authorization distinct when describing the result.
How do I inspect the complete result?
Read the component fields rather than judging only the final label. A weak-password flag can have a specific cause, and a bcrypt record includes format and cost information as well as its digest. A JWT has a header, payload and signature section, but the presence of all three does not verify them. Preserve the explicit limitation flags in your notes. Removing a field such as signatureVerified changes the practical meaning of the report. If a destination expects a specific record format, compare that whole format instead of copying only a convenient substring.
Why should public examples remain separate from secrets?
A string printed in a guide is known to everyone reading that guide. Its complexity or hash length cannot restore secrecy. Use a fresh independent value when creating a real password, and use sample data while discussing a token or configuration on a shared screen. Do not publish a live token simply because its payload decodes cleanly. A decoded token can retain private data and a credential can remain usable after inspection. The tool’s local processing behavior is separate from the decision to share its input or resulting record.
Is this a cracking-time estimate?
No. It is an explicit length and variety heuristic.
Does it query breach databases?
No. Only a small local example list is checked.
Can a high score still be predictable?
Yes. Personal details and unlisted dictionary patterns may pass these rules.